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The fall of Suharto in 1998 and Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian regime 
to a democratic and decentralized regime was a dramatic change that triggered a great 
deal of interest among social scientists studying Indonesia. One of the most intriguing 
topics is the rise of violent groups and organizations at the local level.2 Transitions 
from one regime to another are often characterized by social instability and insecurity, 
and such conditions may allow the rise of groups and organizations that use violence 
to achieve their goals. They may take the form of vigilante groups intent on defending 
their ethnic- or religious-based communities, or the form of gangsters' organizations 
that make the most of local insecurity to expand their socio-economic and political 
power. For example, post-authoritarian Russia was characterized by the socio­
economic emergence of violent entrepreneurs.3 In the case of Indonesia, the 
revolutionary period from 1945 to 1949, especially 1945-1946, was likewise an era
1 This article is based on research conducted under the aegis of JSPS-NRCT Core University Program.
We deeply appreciate the referees' comments and the editors' persistent efforts to improve the article.
2 There are several studies on these groups and organizations. On the rising militias in North Sulawesi 
Province, Indonesia, see Michael Jacobsen, "To Be or What to Be—That is the Question,"Southeast Asia 
Research Center Working Paper Series, No. 29 (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2002), pp. 1-30.
On the Jakarta-based FBR (Forum Betawi Rumpug, Betawi Brotherhood Forum) and FPI (Front Pembela 
Islam, the Defenders of Islam Front), see Ian Douglas Wilson, "Continuity and Change: The Changing 
Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia," Critical Asian Studies 38,2 (2006): 265-97. 
Also on FBR, see Untung Widyanto, "Antara Jago dan Preman: Studi Tentang Habitus Premanisme pada 
Organisasi Forum Betawi Rumpug (FBR)" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 2005). On several 
emerging "security" groups and organizations, see Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi, ed. 
Abdur Rozaki and Okamoto Masaaki (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2006).
3 See Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making o f Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY, 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2002).
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marked by the activities of autonomous jago, or bandits. The jago sometimes 
successfully seized social and even political power at local levels. For example, during 
the revolutionary period, in Kerawang district, one jago called Boebar seized the office 
of district head (bupati) and installed himself as bupati. In Tangerang district, the people 
(rakyat) rose up and the father of rakyat (Bapak Rakyat) expelled the Tangerang bupati, 
R.A. Padmanegara, from office and established his own government. Usually, their 
autonomy relative to the state didn't last long, however, and the state reasserted 
control, forcing the jagos to cooperate or putting them under tight controls and limiting 
their political exposure to the public.4
A decade has passed since the fall of Indonesia's authoritarian Suharto regime, and 
violent groups in the nation have prospered. This does not mean that Indonesia is on 
the verge of collapse and should be considered a failing or failed state.5 On the 
contrary, Indonesia is becoming more stable, for the activities of private security 
providers (such as jago or jawara, as explained below) do not directly lead to ethnic and 
religious violent conflicts, even though these actors tend to be violent and to disperse 
violence throughout the country.6 The fact that the state is no longer the sole authority,
4 There are several studies on jago in Java. On the jago during the colonial period, see Ong Hok Ham, "The 
Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair," in Southeast 
Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1978). Also see Ong Hok Ham, "The Jago in Colonial Java: An Ambivalent Champion of the 
People," in History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia, ed. A. Turton and S. Tanabe Senri (Osaka: 
National Museum of Ethnology, 1984). See also Henk Schulte Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow: Crime 
and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java," trans. Ernst van Lennep, RIMA 25,1 (Winter, 1991): 74—92. On 
the revolutionary period, for example, see Julianto Ibrahim, Bandit dan Pejuang di Simpang Bengawan: 
Kriminalitas dan Kekerasan Masa Revolusi di Surakarta (Wonogiri: Bina Citra Pustaka, 2004). On the blater 
(thugs) in Madura, see Abdur Rozaki, Menabur Kharisma Menuai Kuasa: Kiprah Kiai dan Blater sebagai Rezim 
Kembar di Madura (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2004). On the jawara in Banten, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, The 
Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Condition, Course and Sequel—A Case Study of Social Movements in 
Indonesia (s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); Michale C. Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in 
Banten (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990); M.A. Tihami, "Kiyai dan 
Jawara di Banten" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 1992); and Ian Douglas Wilson, "The Politics 
of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java" (PhD dissertation, Murdoch University, 2002).
5 In 2002, Robert I. Rotberg categorized Indonesia as "another example of weakness avoiding failure 
despite widespread insecurity" and "a state that is designated weak but that encompasses and spreads 
into the category of failure—the precursor to true failure." See Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of 
Nation-State Failure," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2002): 85-96. On the other hand, Michael Malley 
contends that the country's conditions are less dire than popularly believed: "...Indonesia appears 
vulnerable and weak, but hardly failing, let alone failed or collapsed." See Michael Malley, "Indonesia: 
The Erosion of State Capacity" in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 183. Malley mentions three factors that moderate 
the impact of political and economic challenges that arose in 1997-1998 (i.e., the unchallenged state's 
territorial claims, the relatively good socio-economic conditions, and international support for Indonesia's 
territorial integrity as well as political and economic reform), but he misses the fact that the political 
oligarchs in Golkar (the ruling party) preempted the institutional reform of political systems from the 
authoritarian to the democratic, and that this preemption alleviated the radicalization of the political 
movements. On the internal dynamics within Golkar during the critical period 1997-1999, from the 
perspective of an insider, see Akbar Tandjung, The Golkar Way: Survival Partai Golkar di Tengah Turbulensi 
Politik Era Transisi (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007). Akbar Tanjung proudly emphasized how 
successfully he and other Golkar cadres kept Golkar alive and paved the way for democratization in a 
"moderate" way.
6 "Jawara" is the local term for thugs. During the Dutch colonial period, jawara operated as a kind of rural 
strongman or "man of prowess" living in and around villages in Banten. They were skilled in Indonesian 
traditional martial arts called pencak silat. Some were even believed to possess magical powers (ilmu). 
Jawara were part village security and part outlaw. They inhabited the underground world of bandits and 
thieves, and were often involved in criminal activities such as robbery and extortion. Their ambivalent
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the single coercive force, and the chief stake-holder in Indonesia has not led to the 
chaos some might have predicted.
The state has changed its stance toward private forces7 and has delegated wider 
authority to private forces than before, not only because of the state's reduced 
capability to maintain order in a tumultuous society, but also because of the 
government's changing paradigm vis-a-vis security, which I explain later. This change 
enables several locally entrenched violent groups and organizations to continue to 
wield their socio-economic and political influences, and in many cases the individuals 
controlling them have shrewdly transformed themselves into powerful local oligarchs.
Those powerful local oligarchs are not as strong and independent as journalists' 
stories of Raja Kecil (small king) depict, however. Just after the introduction of 
democratization and decentralization, many articles stressed the rise of Raja Kecils, 
who were said to be autonomous from the central government and who had 
reportedly entrenched themselves in their own bailiwicks. Unfortunately, those 
researchers paid less attention to the limits or the circumscription of local power. In 
fact, the local heads in Indonesia are not typically formidable warlords, and they are 
not entirely autonomous. The central government sometimes intervenes in local 
politics using its legal and political power if major state stakes are highly threatened or 
local politics become too chaotic or corrupt. The local oligarchs can be targeted for 
investigation and arrest if they don't obtain the strong and multilateral political 
support of actors within the central government.
The World Bank report entitled "Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia" 
(Memerangi Korupsi di Indonesia yang Terdesentralisasi), May 2007, detailed the data 
on corruption cases brought against local parliament (Dewan Perwikilan Rakyat 
Daerah, DPRD) members and the local heads of districts and cities. Based on the data 
from all the high public prosecutors' offices from 2002 to September 2006, there were 
265 corruption cases against DPRD members. Moreover, twenty-nine provincial public 
prosecutors' offices handled cases that named 967 DPRD members as suspects, the 
accused, or the condemned. During the same period, permits were issued to 
investigate 327 provincial DPRD members and 735 district or municipal DPRD 
members. There were also forty-six corruption cases involving sixty-three local heads 
as either suspects, the accused, or the condemned. Based on the data from the 
department of home affairs during 2004 to early 2006, permits were issued to 
investigate seven governors and sixty bupati/mayors or vice bupati/mayors.8 For 
example, as of September 2007, the governor in East Kalimantan was in jail and two
status in society, plus their physical and "magical" abilities, gave them informal social and political power. 
See Okamoto Masaaki, "An Unholy Alliance: Political Thugs and Political Islam Work Together in 
Banten," Inside Indonesia 93 (August-October 2008), viewed at http: / / insideindonesia.org/content/ 
view/1101 /47/ on September 29, 2008.
7 To some it may sean strange that private forces of any kind are given power, but both their existence and 
influence are considered normal in Indonesia. Private forces' core manbers often have strong relationships 
with official "security" organizations, such as the police and military, while the groups' commonmanbers 
are recruited from among the poor. The existence of private security forces has been ensured because the 
police and military forces continue to use than as security enforcers and because they fulfill a generally 
useful role within society.
8 Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo, and Dewi Damayanti, "Memerangi Korupsi di Indonesia yang 
Terdesentralisasi: Studi Kasus Penanganan Korupsi Pemerintahan Daerah," Justice for the Poor Project, 
Bank Dunia, 2007, p. 2.
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governors in East Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan had been interrogated as 
suspects. Bupati in Kutai, Garut, and Kendal and mayors in Kendari, Medan, and 
Kupang had been interrogated as suspects. The arrest of Syaukani, bupati of Kutai 
district, in East Kalimantan, and one of Indonesia's leading local oligarchs, clearly 
demonstrated the limited autonomy of local oligarchs.9
In addition, many local governments are not resource rich, and therefore some 
local oligarchs depend on rents from the central government to ensure their own 
politico-economic power, and in that sense they are local rent-seekers who are often 
limited by the central government.10
This paper analyzes the fluctuating relationship between the central government 
and local violent oligarchs, focusing on Banten, Indonesia. It is in the Banten area that a 
violent local oligarch has most successfully entrenched himself economically and 
politically, at least until now. There are area-specific reasons for this success. First of 
all, the Banten area is located in the vicinity of the capital, Jakarta, and, therefore, 
security is quite important and private security providers can flourish in collaboration 
with the police and military. The local oligarch has organized these private security 
providers. Second, jago and jawara in the Banten area have used coercive force to gain 
social influence and to secure local political power during a time marked by 
disturbances. Third, the Banten region is just far enough from Jakarta to have 
poverty-stricken areas. As such, it is unattractive to competent intellectuals and 
businessmen, who can choose to live elsewhere. The result is the absence of an 
intellectual middle class, the presence of which could effectively restrain the success of 
violent rent-seekers.
There are already several case studies on the Banten area, such as the works of 
Syarif Hidayat (on Tuan Besar) and Lili Romli (on "bossism plus").11 In our opinion,
9 Syaukani was sentenced to six years in prison and forced to forfeit around 50 billion rupiah for his role 
in three corruption cases (involving the equilibrium fund, land acquisition for Loa Kul airport, and 
social-aid monies). The Golkar party didn't give Syaukani any clear political help even though he was one 
of its leading figures in the province. See "MA Vonis Syaukani Enam Tahun," Kompas.com, viewed at 
www.kompas.com/read/ xml/ 2008/07/29/00512211 /ma.vonis.syaukani.enam.tahun on October 14,
2008.
10 Wahyu Prasetyawan aptly describes the importance of the political network of local elites to the central 
government, focusing on the resource-rich areas and on conflicts concerning the control of state-owned 
natural resources. Actually, the political networks linking regions to the central government are also 
important in many areas where the natural resources are scarce and revenues from those sources minimal. 
In such places, the rents received from central and local governments provide vital revenues. See Wahyu 
Prasetyawan, "Government and Multinationals: Conflict over Economic Resources in East Kalimantan, 
1998-2003," Southeast Asian Studies 43,2 (September 2005): 161-90; and Wahyu Prasetyawan, "The 
Unifinished Privitization of the Semen Padang: The Structure of Political Economy in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia," Indonesia 81 (April 2006): 51-70.
11 See Syarif Hidayat, "'Shadow State'?: Business and Politics in the Province of Banten," in Local Power 
and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 203-24; and Lili Romli, "jawara dan Penguasa Lokal di Provinsi Banten 
(2001-2006)" (PhD dissertation, University of Indonesia, 2007). Lili Romli added the term "plus" to Sidel's 
"bossism" to help describe the local politics in Banten because, according to Lili Romli, the jawara controls 
not only public servants but also civil society (p. 258). In our opinion, Sidel's concept of "bossism" is that 
the predatory nature of local strongmen in the Philippines is caused by the nature of the Filipino state and 
"bossism" emphasizes the irrelevance of the framework of patron-client relationships to explain local 
politics in the Philippines. In that sense, it is not correct to extend Sidel's argument of bossism this way.
The local strongman's control of civil society is part of Sidel's concept of "bossism." And furthermore, as
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these works put too much emphasis on the autonomous hegemony of one local 
oligarch, Chasan Sochib, and tend to ignore the fragile aspect of his political base, 
especially after the introduction in 2006 of direct regional-head elections. Instead, this 
paper will examine Chasan Sochib's susceptibility and vulnerability both to the central 
government and to demands from his own constituency; it will also explore his 
ideology and his strategy to maintain and reinforce his fragile power base. His 
nationalist ideology serves him well because it allows the central government to 
support him for achieving and maintaining Banten's political stability.
The Banten area is located at the western tip of Java Island. Serang city, the 
provincial capital of Banten province, is about a two-hour drive from Jakarta. The 
Banten area separated from West Java province in 2000 and became a separate 
province with a population of about eight million persons. Based on the 2000 census, 
95.7 percent of the total population are Muslim and 46.9 percent consider themselves to 
be ethnic Bantenese.
The Banten area is largely composed of two parts (see map on the next page). The 
northern area has been settled mainly by ethnic Javanese and the southern area mainly 
by ethnic Sundanese. The northern area is where the jawara are concentrated, and they 
supported the communist uprising in 1926. The two areas' dividing line is around the 
subdistricts of Ciomas and Pabuaran; these subdistricts are Sundanese-speaking and 
famous for their ulama (Islamic preachers) and jawara.12 Chasan came from this area. 
The political, economic, social, and cultural center of Banten has always been in the 
north and the north dominates the south. But interestingly, there appears to be no 
history or record of friction between the two language groups, their regional identity 
as Bantenese being the stronger factor.13 Therefore, despite all their differences, both 
those living in the northern and southern parts of Banten jointly decided to call 
themselves Bantenese and to have their own province of Banten, an effort that was 
finally realized in 2000.
Administratively, Banten province is composed of three cities (Serang, Cilegon, and 
Tangerang) and four kabupaten, or regencies (Serang, Lebak, Pandeglang, and 
Tangerang). The northern and eastern parts of the province—that is Cilegon city, 
Serang city, the northern part of Serang district, and Tangerang city and district—are 
industrial areas. The southern part of the province that includes Lebak, Pandeglang, 
and the southern part of Serang district are poor, agricultural areas. Many pesantren 
(Islamic boarding schools) exist, especially in the southern regions. The ulama in 
pesantren function as informal leaders, as do the jawara. As noted earlier, jawara are 
rural strongmen or semi-socially embedded men of prowess who are skillful in pencak
we mentioned, Chasan's controlling power is not so strong enough against the central government and the 
civil society.
12 M. A. Tihami, "Kiyai dan Jawara di Banten" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 1992), pp. 30-32, 
50.
13 Michael C. Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1990), p. 2. One exceptional case was the movement to establish a South Banten 
province in 2002. After the Banten province was established, Uwes Qorni, one of the staunch southern 
supporters of the new Banten province, was quite disappointed with the dominant role of the northern 
elite in the provincial administration and the provincial development projects, and so he pressed for the 
establishment of an independent southern province. But after his death, the movement to establish a South 
Banten province ceased. "Isu Provinsi Banten Selatan Menguat," Harian Banten, February 16, 2002.
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silat (Indonesian traditional martial arts), and some are believed to have magical 
power, called ilmu.14 15Jawara partly live in the underground world and are often 
involved in criminal activities.|S This ambiguous social status and their physical and 
alleged magical powers give them social standing. They were initially identified in 
Java in the early nineteenth century.
Banten Province
Historical Encounter of the State with the Javanese Underground
In the early nineteenth century, Bantenese jawara were known to the Dutch colonial 
bureaucrats, and the Banten area was notoriously insecure.16 During the nineteenth 
century, Banten was one of the most restless areas of Dutch-ruled Java. In the period 
1810-1870 alone, no fewer than nineteen uprisings are recorded to have taken place 
there.17
In Java, the business of a thief is an occupation which is a part of the municipal 
service, which provides many people with a job, some with an investment, and 
which provides many benefits to its protectors ... No desa [village] headman
14 "Ilmu" is of Arabic origin and has two meanings. One is "science" or "knowledge" and the other is 
"supernatural knowledge." Within the Banten context, the meaning of ilmu is "supernatural knowledge."
15 Masaaki, "An Unholy Alliance."
16 Williams, Coininnnivin, Religion, and Revolt in Banten, pp. 45-47.
17 Ibid., p. 79.
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considers his desa complete and in good order if it does not have at least one 
thief—often several who are under the command of the oldest or cleverest thief, 
who is called Djago ...18
The above report, which we find fascinating, was written in 1872 by a private 
tobacco planter at Kediri. He sketched a situation of the Javanese countryside where 
cattle rustling, intimidation, arson, land-tax fraud, and physical violence occurred 
daily and where the colonial administration had lost its grip completely.
In colonial Banten, the main actors were jawara. As mentioned above, jawara have a 
kind of social power that allows them sometimes to violate community rules and 
(threaten to) use force as necessary. Some of them ripped off the "security" fees or land 
fees from the gambling dens and brothels, or were engaged in criminal activities or 
activities that were "almost" crimes, such as mooching and blackmailing. Jawara have 
been responsible for rustling and selling cattle through their own region-wide network. 
Others became "security providers" for villages as valets for the respective village 
heads, or they themselves became village heads.
From the early nineteenth century onwards, the Dutch colonial state started to 
expand its power down to the village level in Java. The opium farm revenue system 
operated by Chinese entrepreneurs developed hand-in-hand with the official 
bureaucracy and initiated widespread cooperation between village heads and jago, or 
jagabaya (the local Javanese term for a bandit). Village heads had become terminal 
bureaucrats rather than influential community leaders. These village heads drew their 
authority from the Dutch colonial state by being recognized officially as the "formal" 
leaders of the village, and they exploited the villagers by demanding tax and corvee 
labor at the request of the Dutch colonial state. The village heads thereby strengthened 
and centralized their own and the Dutch power in the villages. Some jago or jagabaya 
came to serve the "formal" village heads and helped them collect tax by intimidation 
and violence, while other jago gained power by assisting the Chinese opium farmers in 
colonial Java.19 A network of cooperation and tolerant relationships among village 
heads, jago, and the central government are generally understood to have linked the 
Dutch colonial state and villages in Java. The history in the Banten area was a little bit 
different, however.
The consolidation and centralization of power under village heads was only 
partially successful in the Banten area20 because the colonial opium cultivation 
system—typically, a key element in the consolidation and centralization of power at 
the local level—never took root in that region.21 The Banten area was closed for opium 
sales and did not host an official opium farm.22 As a result, conspicuous power sharing
18 See Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java," pp. 74—91.
19 For a definitive description of the opium farming system in colonial Java, see James R. Rush, Opium to 
Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910 (Ithaca, NY, and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990).
20Uemura Yasuo, "19 Seiki Kohan—20 Seiki Shotou Jawa Madura no Desa Schuchou no Shakaiteki Chii wo 
Megutte [On the Social Status of the Desa Head in Java and Madura in the End of the Nineteenth Century 
to the Early Twentieth Century]," Toyoshi Kenkyu (Oriental Studies) 47,3 (1988): 86-87.
21 Fujita Eri, "Shokuminchiki Jawa no Chourou to Banten Sonraku [The Influential Persons and the 
Bantenese Villages in Colonial Java]," Shigaku Kenkyu (Historical Studies), 234 (2001): 39—42.
22 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 27.
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between the formal leaders and informal leaders persisted in Banten, and the state's 
penetration into society was weak, for it had no motive to exert control over private 
violence in that region. For this reason, jawara continued to exist in the Banten area as 
an independent and influential social power, along with ulama, even into the 
twenty-first century. In the late nineteenth century, an anti-colonial struggle called the 
Cilegon rebellion erupted in Banten. Jawara and ulama fought together against the 
Dutch colonial forces. In the 1920s, when the communist party expanded its influence 
rapidly, some Bantenese jawara again allied with ulama and joined the party to resist 
the Dutch. The Bantenese branch of the Indonesian communist party even established 
a jawara section and ulama section.23
After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, a power vacuum emerged. Even 
though Sukarno and Hatta immediately declared the independence of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the republic had no substance, and in many places order disintegrated. In 
the case of the Banten area, the disruption of order was followed by a social revolution 
that incited ethnic and class conflict. The Dutch colonial regime and the Japanese 
military regime had elevated outside elites to be Banten's top bureaucrats. The 
majority of them were Sundanese from the Priangan area, who frequently found it 
difficult to adjust to their new posting because of its profoundly Islamic atmosphere 
and the lack of formal respect shown to them. This difficulty prompted these ruling 
elites to coin the term "Banten bantahan" (recalcitrant or obstinate Banten).24 On the 
other hand, the Bantenese were unhappy with being ruled by outsiders and harbored 
xenophobic feelings. Therefore, the end of the Japanese occupation provided jawara 
and ulama the opportunity to lead an uprising to force the Sundanese bureaucrats from 
power and grab the "formal" power for themselves.25 The social and political 
turbulence moved jawara and ulama onto the political stage. But the takeover of the 
local state by informal leaders did not last long. When the Indonesian state seized 
sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949 and started to construct the new nation, jawara 
were ousted from their upper-level bureaucratic positions. Many of them rejoined the 
criminals' underworld.
Jawara in the New Order26
The state became strong again with the rise of Suharto as president in the 
mid-1960s, after a long period when the state had been relatively weak. The notorious 
September 30 affair in 1965 initiated the new era, as the military, led by Suharto, began 
rounding up purported enemies of the state, and military and Islamic activists killed
23 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten, p. 196.
24 Ibid., pp. 68-70.
25 Ibid., pp. 275-309; Okamoto Masaaki, "Kakumeiki wo Ikinuita Shokuminchi Kizoku Kanryoutachi 
(Pangreh Praja): Indonesia Nishi Jawa Shuu no Baai (The Colonial Aristocratic Bureaucrats [Pangreh Praja] 
Surviving the Revolution: The Case of West Java, Indonesia)," Southeast Asian Studies 38,2 (2000): 211-12.
26 Part of this section comes from Okamoto Masaaki, "Local Politics in Decentralized Indonesia: The 
Governor General of Banten Province," HAS Newsletter 34 (July 2004): 23; and Okamoto Masaaki, 
"Indonesia niokeru Chiho Seiji no Kasseika to Shuu 'Soutoku' no Tanjo: Banten Chiho no Seiji: 1998-2003 
[Activated Local Power Politics in Indonesia and the Birth of a Provincial 'Governor-General': Politics in 
the Banten Area, 1998-2003]," Southeast Asian Studies 34,1 (June 2005): 3-25.
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approximately 500,000 "communists" and arrested around a million more.27 From that 
time, the authoritarian Suharto regime started to control Indonesian society using both 
the carrot and the stick. The state was omnipresent. Jawara and ulama in Banten soon 
became the targets of these efforts to regain control.
Banten's New Order regime cemented the ethnic divide between rulers and the 
ruled, which had its roots in the Dutch colonial period. Mainly Sundanese from the 
Priangan area held the important administrative and military positions of bupati, 
regional secretary, and district military commander. For example, twelve out of 
seventeen bupatis in Serang, Lebak, and Pandeglang from 1970 to 1998 were 
non-Bantenese (with the ethnic identity of one of the seventeen being unknown).28 A 
small number of Bantenese obtained relatively high bureaucratic positions; just 10 
percent of middle-level bureaucratic positions in Serang district in the late 1990s were 
held by native Bantenese.29
Bantenese informal leaders—ulama and jawara—were co-opted into the political 
machines of the governing party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups), in the 
early 1970s. Ironically, the New Order government followed the example of the Banten 
section of the 1920s communist party in organizing two social powers. In 1971 ulama 
were organized into the Ulama Work Squad (SatKar Ulama) and local jawara were 
organized into the Martial Artist Work Squad (SatKar Pendekar) in 1972; this group 
was subsequently renamed the Indonesian Union of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, 
Art, and Culture (Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, 
PPPSBBI). The 122 PPPSBBI-affiliated silat schools in Banten were mobilized to support 
Golkar during the election, alongside the military and police. Chasan Sochib, who 
often said, "I am a jawara [saya seorang jawara],"30 was the jawara who became the 
SatKar Pendekar's general chairman and one of the executive committee members of 
the SatKar Ulama. He acted as a bridge between the military, bureaucracy, and Golkar, 
and to Banten's society, including the underground (criminal) world. According to 
Chasan, three thousand jawara serve him and are on standby at all times.31
Chasan Sochib: Product of the New Order
Chasan was born in Serang regency in 1930. He attended a pesantren before joining 
a guerrilla warfare unit during the revolutionary period. His job experience, starting 
with logistic support for the Siliwangi military division, began in 1967. Two years later 
he founded a construction company, CV Sinar Ciomas, later PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, 
which frequently won government contracts for road and market construction projects,
27 The actual numbers of those killed, arrested, and detained remain unknown. According to different 
sources, the death toll varies from 78,000 to a million, and the number of those arrested varies from 
600,000 to 1,700,000. See Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings: Pembantaian PKI di Jawa dan Bali 
1965-1966 (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2000), pp. 23-25, 78-79.
28 Masaaki, "Indonesia niokeru Chiho Seiji no Kasseika to Shuu 'Soutoku' no Tanjo: Banten Chiho no Seiji: 
1998-2003," p. 9.
29 Interview with Rush Ridwan on May 4, 2000. Rush Ridwan was the regional secretary of Cilegon city 
from 2000 to 2005 and, at this writing, has been vice mayor of Cilegon since 2005.
30 "Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah," Tempo 9 (December 2007), p. 34.
31 "Tubagus 'Abah' Chasan Sochib: Saya Memang Gubernur Jenderal," Mimbar Daerah 1,9 (November 
17-23, 2003).
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such as the Rau Market construction project and road building projects in Bekasi 
district and Karawang district. His involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel State 
Company, the largest steel company in Southeast Asia, and into tourism and real 
estate. He also held key positions in associations such as the Regional and Central 
Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Kadin) and the 
Indonesian National Contractors' Association (Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi 
Nasional Indonesia, Gapensi), putting his men on these associations' executive 
committees at the local level.
Certifications from Kadin and Gapensi are necessary for government procurement. 
Chasan used this requirement to coordinate projects in the Banten area. Coordination 
brought him more money and economic power. Kartiwa Supriatna, a resident (vice 
governor) of West Java province in charge of the Banten area in 1976-1983, attested to 
Chasan's project-coordinating skills at that time and thus his ability to amass social 
prestige and wealth.32
With his coordinating and enforcing power in hand, both the jazoara under his 
control and his other followers became his (sub)contractors and received a share of his 
profits or became bureaucrats. For example, Embay Mulya Syarif, who later became 
critical of Chasan, was helped by him and became a cadre of Gapensi and the head of 
Kadin in Serang district. The one-time (2000) secretary general of PPPSBBI 
headquarters, Kasmiri Assabudu, owned a construction company, Bunda.33 Uci 
Sanusi, another contractor associated with Chasan, later became a local 
parliamentarian in the district. The present secretary general of PPPSBBI in Serang 
district, Mas Santoso, joined the local bureaucracy and later became head of Serang 
district's sanitation department.34
Chasan's activities were not limited to the jawara and business worlds. He was one 
of the founders of a private university and the Banten Museum, and he remains the 
head of the Serang branch of Generation '45 (a committee for former members of 
Indonesia's independence forces).
Chasan became influential in many aspects of Bantenese life and played a role as 
interlocutor for Jakarta and Bandung; outsiders appointed as top bureaucrats relied on 
him and his network as a bridge to the Bantenese world. The locally stationed police 
and army officers had a close relationship with him. Chasan's and the PPPSBBI's 
ideologies are quite nationalistic, and he boasted that PPPSBBI was the only NGO that 
"protected [the people], defending the state and nation" and also "defending the 
police" and "defending the military."35 Chasan even went so far as to say that
32 Interview with Kartiwa Supriatna on December 8, 2003.
33 Khatib Mansur, Profit Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib beserta Komentar 100 Tokoh Masyarakat Seputer Pendekar 
Banten (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Utama, 2000), pp. 208-9.
34 Chasan's nurturing of his proteges went on for years. Consider the case of Danu Ahmad, who became 
the head of Gapensi in Serang district in 2000. When he was twenty years old in 1977, Chasan interviewed 
him and asked whether he could read, write, and do math (calculations). Despite answering yes, Danu 
Ahmad became a sort of personal valet to Chasan, attending to his hygiene and wardrobe. Two years later 
Danu became Chasan's confidant. Several months later he was given a check worth 15 million rupiah as a 
retirement allowance and told to go start a new business. Danu Ahmad thereupon established a 
construction company, Danu ATSS Perkasa. Ibid., pp. 168-70.
35 Ibid., p. 89.
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PPPSBBI loved the police and military because these organizations had supported the 
mandate for the independence proclamation of 1945.36 In fact, PPPSBBI assisted the 
police and army by providing silat training to their members37 and some financial aid 
from its business profits.38 Given his local power networks and nationalistic ideology, 
Chasan was able to establish close ties with Golkar's central board members, such as 
Akbar Tanjung, and the army leaders in the New Order. The fall of Suharto in May 
1998, however, changed this informal governing system. Chasan, product of the New 
Order, was now suddenly endangered.
Rise of the Reformed Chasan Sochib
The Reformasi had wide repercussions in Banten. Students mounted a nationwide 
protest movement against Suharto and his regime, demanding his resignation and the 
reformation of government. Student demonstrators criticized Chasan for his closeness 
to Suharto. He responded: "You know, Pak Harto [Suharto] is still our president. We 
should respect him!" However, Chasan's attitude changed when Suharto resigned. 
When students confronted him following that event, he jumped on the Reformasi 
bandwagon, saying "Pak Harto really resigned. After his resignation, I finally decided 
my attitude. Pak Harto resigned after a long contemplation. Now I will support the 
Reformasi definitely, too."39 In other words, just as Suharto's resignation showed that 
he, Suharto, had had a change of heart after much thoughtful consideration, he, 
Chasan, could change his mind, too, about reformasi.
A favorable wind has blown for Chasan. The movement to separate Banten from 
West Java province began in February 1999. At first Chasan was far from supportive of 
such a plan; his company was engaged in a large-scale road construction project in 
Tasikmalaya district, having been hired by the West Java provincial government. Yet 
when he realized that the separatist movement had deep-rooted and widespread 
support in Banten, he became an enthusiastic proponent. He became the general 
adviser to the Coordination Committee to Establish Banten Province (Badan 
Koordinasi Pembentukan Provinsi Banten, Bakor) in February 2000. Bakor was the core 
organization to promote the establishment of the new province. Mass mobilization, 
money, and a lobbying campaign aimed at the central government all eventually bore 
fruit. In October 2000, the law establishing Banten province was passed in parliament. 
Thousands of Bantenese welcomed the change, and Chasan, shrewdly, had ensured 
that he was in a position to take credit for it.
Chasan Sochib's Entrenched Power
Banten's successful drive to establish itself as an independent province benefited 
Chasan by improving his former, tarnished image as a staunch supporter of Suharto.
36 Ibid.
37 See Wilson, "The Politics of Inner Power," p. 259; and "Polwil Banten Gandeng Pendekar," Harian 
Banten, August 3, 2001.
38 Interview with an NGO activist on December 6, 2003.
39 Heri Ch. Burmelli, "Kolom Heri Ch. Burmelli: Chasan Sochib Sosok Fanatisme Banten Paling Hebat," 
Banten Ekspres, March, 20-26,2000.
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But the movement alone was not enough to enable him to entrench himself 
economically and politically. He realized that he would have to institute new forms of 
local governance to garner full political and economic power. So he supported 
democratization and decentralization, which gave local entities the opportunity to 
participate in politics by using various types of social power. In particular, those 
structures allowed businessmen and religious leaders to emerge as political actors. 
Violent social actors, such as jawara, were not intended to be empowered. Yet the 
jawaras' power did increase. The new state's inherent weakness relative to that of 
Suharto's state might be one of the reasons that jawara gained power, but more 
fundamentally, the post-Reformasi state simply accepted the participation of vigilante 
groups more readily than had the New Order government, which always tried to 
manage and on occasion even eradicated private security forces that became 
intractable. In the post-Suharto state, the role of the police in maintaining internal 
security was increased vis-a-vis the military, and the police gave a substantial role to 
private security forces. This is shown in the new law on the police. Article 3, Law No. 
2/2002, on the National Police of Republic of Indonesia, stipulates that the policing 
function is the responsibility of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia, which 
can be assisted by:
1. Special Police
2. Investigating Officer of Civil Servants, and
3. Civilian Militia40
The Indonesian police clearly recognize vigilante security groups and 
organizations, and they tend to allow these groups great operational latitude. For 
example, in Bali and West Sumbawa, respectively, it is accepted that two "traditional" 
local vigilante groups—the Pecalang in Bali and the Lang-lang in West Sumbawa—will 
handle local security and maintain order.41 In fact, the Pecalang in Bali are undergoing 
a period of revival, as they appear to have claimed and been entrusted with the 
responsibility to preserve Bali's customs and cultures from external influences that 
many consider threatening.42 Publicly, of course, the police do not recognize violent 
criminal organizations as security providers, but it is often difficult to draw the 
boundary between "normal" security providers and "criminal" security providers once 
security becomes privatized. The fact that all private security providers emphasize 
their partnership with formal security forces tends to make the distinction between
40 Actually, a civilian militia (bentuk-bentuk pengamanan swakarsa) was mentioned as a legitimate security 
force in Law No. 28/1997, which was signed by Suharto on October 7, 1997, about a half year before his 
resignation. However, elucidation of the article related to the civilian militia only mentioned satuan 
pengamanan lingkungan (surroundings security units) under the state surveillance system, such as Satpam, 
Hansip (civil defense force), and the ronda (night guard). The article didn't mention business companies in 
the security sector (badan usaha di bidang usaha pengamanan). Law No. 28/1997 was the product of the New 
Order, and civilian militia-type security was expected to be part of the state's surveillance system, and not 
to be delegated to independent organizations.
41 Kombes Pol. Pur. Drs. M. Wresniwiro, "Membangun Sistem Penagamanan Terpadu," Membangun 
Budaya Pengamanan Swakarya, ed. Kombes Pol. Pur. Drs. M. Wresniwiro, A. Haris Sumarna dan Dede 
Permana S. (Jakarta: Yayasan Mitra Bintibmas, 2002), pp. 6-8.
42 I Ngurah Suryawan, "Bisnis Kekerasan Jagoan Berkeris: Catatan Awal Aksi Pecalang dan Kelompok 
Milisi di Bali," Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi, ed. Okamoto Masaaki and Abdur Rozaki 
(Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2005), p. 98.
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"normal" and "criminal" even more vague. This collusion between parts of the formal 
security forces and private security providers is commonplace in Indonesia.
Recognizing the fundamental changes in the role of private security, Chasan turned 
to his old methods—reliance on jawara—to take control of Banten province, first 
economically and then politically. In November 2000, Hakamuddin Jamal, from South 
Sulawesi province, was appointed as provisional governor to organize the provincial 
government, select the provincial parliament, and direct the parliament in choosing its 
first definitive governor. At Hakamuddin Jamal's inauguration ceremony, Chasan 
stood beside Hakamuddin. Hakamuddin later asked Chasan to guarantee the security 
of the province and rewarded him and his followers for their support with numerous 
contracts for construction projects.43
Throughout the period of Gus Dur's presidency (October 1999 to July 2001), 
political instability was high. Religious and ethnic conflicts in Ambon and Poso 
intensified, the Papuan independence movement became more violent, and bombs 
exploded in the Philippines embassy in Jakarta and the Jakarta stock exchange. The 
area surrounding Jakarta, including Banten, was to be secured by any means. Chasan 
was well-prepared to secure the province in collaboration with the state apparatus. 
With strong support from the state, Chasan became the new Banten provincial branch 
head of Kadin in December 2000 and of Gapensi in April 2002. Chasan became an 
honorary secretary to the Banten provincial branch of the consultants association for all 
Indonesia (Ikatan Nasional Konsultasi Indonesia, INKINDO) in January 2003 and 
became the head of the Construction Business Development Committee (Lembagga 
Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi, LPJK) in January 2001. LPJK is an important 
committee that coordinates many contractors' associations that were organized after 
the fall of Suharto.
Chasan installed his followers as cadres in those organizations44 and put them and 
his children into the newly built business-association branches of Banten. These 
include the Indonesian Association of Indigenous Entrepreneurs (Himpunan 
Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia, HIPPI), Indonesian Association of Construction 
Contractors (Asosiasi Kontraktor Konstruksi Indonesia, AKSI), and Indonesian 
Association of Goods Suppliers and Distributors (Asosiasi Rekanan Pengadaan Barang 
dan Distributor Indonesia, Ardin).45
In addition to his business successes, Chasan became politically powerful. In April 
2001, he became one of the supervisory committee's five members to represent the civil 
society.46 This committee supervised another committee that had the right to 
determine the final parliamentarians based on the 1999 election results. It is not clear to
43 Interview with Heruman Haeruman on August 11, 2003.
44 For example, the cadres of the Banten provincial Kadin branch in 2001-02 were as follows: Iyus 
Suptandar, Aceng Ishak, Ratu Atut Chosiyah (one of Chasan's daughters), Tb. Lulu Kaking, Aenk 
Chaerudin, Danu Achmad, Irja Kharis, and Tatu Chasanah (one of Chasan's daughters). They are all either 
his allies or his children. On the name list of the Banten provincial Kadin branch, see KADIN, KADIN 
Indonesia Directory 2001/2002 (Jakarta: KADIN, 2001), pp. 303-5.
45 Interview with an NGO activist on August 26, 2003.
46 See "Ternyata Panitia Pengawas Belum Dilantik: Bagi Kursi DPRD Batal," Fajar Banten, April 5, 2001; 
and "Tb Chasan Sochib Masuk Anggota Panwas: Dilantik Bersama 240 Pegawai Pemprov," Marian Banten, 
April 10, 2001.
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what extent Chasan exerted his influence on the selection process, but it was said that a 
Javanese, Dharmono K. Lawi, from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), was chosen as the speaker of the 
provincial parliament because of Chasan's influence.47
Table 1
Seat Distribution in Banten Provincial Parliament
PDI-P 19
Golkar 12
PPP 11
Al-Bantani 10
ABK 9
Military and Police 8
Note: A political party that obtains more than 10 percent of the seats can make its own 
faction in the parliament. A parliamentarian from a political party that has fewer than 10 
percent of the seats has to join a certain faction or has to make a faction with other 
parliamentarians from different parties. Al-Bantani faction consists of three from National 
Awakening Party (PKB), one from the United Justice Party (PKP), one from United Party 
(Partai Persatuan), one from Indonesia Sarekat Islam Party, one from Masyumi party, one 
from People Sovereignity Party (PDR), one from Nahdlatul Ummat Party, and one from 
Indonesia Democrat Party (PDI). The ABK (Amanat Bintang Keadilan) faction consists of 
six members of National Mandate Party (PAN), two from the Justice Party (PK), and one 
from the Crescent Star Party (PBB). (PDI-P = Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; 
Golkar = Party of the Functional Groups; PPP = United Development Party.)
In December 2001, the election for provincial governor was held in the provincial 
parliament (see Table 1 for the seat distribution). A Javanese politician, Djoko 
Munandar, from the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP), and Chasan's daughter, Atut Chosiyah, from Golkar, won the governorship and 
vice governorship (see Table 2).48 Atut is Chasan's first daughter by his first wife, Hj. 
Wasiah. Atut was born in Ciomas, Serang District, in 1962. She graduated from a 
banking school in Bandung and was operating a construction company when her 
father asked her to run for the vice governorship. Despite her inexperience in politics, 
Chasan chose her because she had a jawara-like strong mind and self-confidence. In the 
election, out of sixty-nine votes cast, the Djoko-Atut pair captured thirty-seven 
votes—twelve Golkar votes, eleven PPP votes, eight votes from military and police
47 Interview with Ampi Tanujiwa on December 4, 2003.
48 Chasan had even thought to choose Heruman Haeruman (ex-Bappenas deputy head), Ampi Tanujiwa 
(ex-Maulana Yusuf Kodim commander), and Hakamuddin Jamal (provisional provincial governor). 
Chasan did approach Haeruman, but he politely declined Chasan's offer. And it was Djoko Munandar 
(vice mayor of Cilegon city and the provincial branch head of PPP), with eleven PPP seats in the provincial 
parliament, who took the opportunity (naik perahu) to run as governor with Atut. Interview with Heruman 
Haeruman on August 11, 2003.
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factions, and some from the ABK (Amanat, Bintang dan Keadilan, Mandate, Crescent 
and Justice) and Al-Bantani factions.49 That electoral victory would have been 
impossible without Chasan's financial support and jawara's threats of violence aimed 
at parliamentarians.50
Table 2
Election Results of Banten Provincial Governor and Vice Governor
Candidate for Governor
(occupation)
Joko Munandar
(Vice Mayor ofCilegon 
and Provincial Branch 
head of PPP)
Ace Suhaedy Masdupi
(Director of a Lippo 
Group Company)
Heruman Haeruman
(Professor at Bogor 
Agricultural Institute)
Abstentions 
Total Votes
Candidate for Vice Governor 
(occupation)
Atut Chosiyah
(Director of a Construction 
Company)
Tb. Mamas Chaeruddin
(Provincial Branch Head 
ofPDI-P)
Ade Sudirman
(High Official at Department 
of Foreign Affairs)
Recommending Votes
Factions
PPP and 37
Golkar
PDI-P 23
Al-Bantani 5
4
69
Actually, during the process of creating an independent province of Banten, 
Chasan had already expressed his strong desire that Atut be the first vice governor and 
said that he didn't care who the governor would be.51 It was rumored that, before 
election day, he bribed the provincial parliamentarians.52 On December 3, election day, 
jawara dressed in black and armed with golok (a machete-like knife) from PPPSBBI 
"secured" the parliament and two to three jarawa "guarded" each parliamentarian's 
car.53 Money and threats were quite effective in influencing the election results in
49 "'Djoko-Atut' Pemimpin Banten" Harian Banten, December 4, 2001. Interview with Mamas Chaeruddin 
(provincial branch head of PDI-P) on April 1, 2004.
50 One of the best descriptions of the election is Abdul Hamid's graduation thesis. See Abdul Hamid, 
"Peran Jawara Kelompok Rawu Terhadap Kemenangan Pasangan 'Djoko-Atut' Dalam Pemilihan 
Gubernur Banten dan Wakil Gubernur Banten Periode 2001-2006" (BA thesis, University of Indonesia, 
2004).
51 Interview with Ampi Tanujiwa on December 4, 2003, and with Aceng Ishak on April 1, 2004.
52 Abdul Hamid, "Peran Jawara," pp. 93-94.
53 Ibid., p. 95.
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Chasan's favor. It was ironic that Chasan fought to establish the province for the 
Banten people, but he chose two ethnic outsiders, Djoko and Darmono K. Lawi 
(provincial PDIP cadre of Javanese origin), for the governorship and the provincial 
DPRD speaker's post. Installing ethnic outsiders to the executive and legislative top 
posts made it convenient for Chasan to control post-Suharto Banten.
Now Chasan could intervene in provincial government policies regarding 
personnel and budgeting. The provincial parliament was ineffective in stemming his 
intervention. The vice chairperson of committee A (in charge of governance) from the 
Islamic Justice party (Partai Keadilan, PK) even said, lamentably, "The provincial 
government seems to be afraid of making policy decisions even though the plenary 
session in the provincial parliament already agreed with the decisions."54 "We just 
wait for the agreement of Rau" is an often-heard cliche among provincial executives,55 
Rau being the place where almost all of Chasan's business groups and associations 
reside. Chasan's network of social alliances, with its physical power, could effectively 
force its will upon the local government. Facing this criticism of his "dominant societal 
power" (a term used by the Regional Planning Bureau Head of Banten Province), 
Chasan said, "It is not a problem in a democratic country if there exists a social power. 
We are not in a communist country. The people should have power under the present 
new paradigm."56
Chasan's company won construction projects to build the Banten Regional Police 
headquarters, the Provincial Parliament building, the Provincial Government complex, 
and several main roads. He also owned land that was sold to the government for 
unusually large amounts. For example, the Provincial Government procured the land 
for its new police headquarter from Chasan and others. The procurement price was Rp. 
231,500 per square meter, a price substantially higher than the average land price of Rp. 
200,000 per square meter.57 Chasan was said to control more than 60 percent of the 
development budget of those projects worth more than 5 billion rupiah, and in many 
cases Chasan's competitors were given no opportunity to submit bids for the 
contracts.58 He himself admitted that Sinar Ciomas Raya Co. Ltd. handled all projects 
worth more than 10 billion rupiah, and he gave his followers the projects worth less 
than that amount.59
54 "Ade Marfudin, Wakil Ketua Komisi D DPRD Banten: Gubernur Didominasi Kekuatan Luar/' Mimbar 
Daerah, 1,9 (November 17-23, 2003): 3.
55 "Kekecewaan dan Dominasi Kelompok Rawu di Banten," Sinar Harapan, December 27, 2002.
56 "Dua Kelompok Elit Nyatakan Siap Bertemu," Harian Banten, July 2, 2002.
57 According to the 2005 Report by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan, BPK).
58 Interview with a provincial parliamentarian from ABK on December 27, 2007. When Irsyad Djuwaeli, 
from Golkar, in the national parliament, criticized that open bidding was not always held in the Banten 
province, Chasan justified it, saying, "If the public tenders were held for the provincial development 
projects, the local businessmen could not receive any share of the projects." See "Mahasiswa Minta M3B 
Bukan Untuk Golongan: Chasan Sochib: Lebih Baik Dibentuk Bamus," Harian Banten, June 19, 2002.
59 "Tubagus' Abah' Chasan Sochib: 'Saya Memang Gubernur Jenderal/" Mimbar Daerah 1,9 (November 
17-23, 2003). Even if Sinar Ciomas was awarded a project, the company was said to subcontract it to 
another contractor after receiving the commission fee. Interview with Ampi Tanujiwa on December 4, 
2003.
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Chasan proudly stated, "I am actually the Governor-General. If he [Djoko 
Munandar] goes wrong in leading Banten, I will correct him. I am most responsible for 
him. He rose with my support."60 Chasan's power is not unlimited, however, and he 
understands that he may not act independently from the central government in 
Jakarta. That is why he co-opts important national-government figures in Jakarta by 
appointing them as members of PPPSBBI's honorary or advisory boards every time 
they visit Banten. Some of those who have been appointed include Da'i Bachtiar (the 
head of the Indonesian police), Taufik Kiemas (husband of ex-president Megawati), 
Guru Sukarnoputri (Sukarno's son), and MA. Rahman (ex-attorney general).61 Chasan 
has maintained strong links with Golkar's central board, while Atut successfully 
forged a close relationship with Jusuf Kalla, Golkar's vice president, and, with Jusuf s 
support, she became Golkar's vice treasurer of the central board (2004-2009). These 
strong and multilateral political networks seem to have saved Chasan and his daughter 
from being charged with corruption.
For example, bantenlink.com, a news website about Banten province, detailed two 
corruption cases involving Chasan and Atut. One concerns the corruption related to 
land procurement in Karangsari. The other has to do with the abuse of an emergency 
budget established to support the purchase of parliamentarians' houses. In the latter 
case, the governor, Djoko Munandar, and three other legislative members, Daromono 
(speaker), Mufrodi (vice speaker), and Muslim Djamaluddin (vice speaker), were 
found guilty. Atut, Chaeron Muchsin (provincial secretary), and other provincial 
government officers attended the meetings during which it was decided how to use the 
emergency fund, but they are free, at least until now, and Atut has never been 
questioned by the prosecution.62 Depending on how the political tide turns, however, 
Chasan and Atut could be summoned at any time by the police or the prosecution. 
That could occur if central-government leaders discover a more attractive alternative to 
the Rau group's influence and resources, or determine that the Rau group's network 
has weakened and become relatively ineffective. In either case, Chasan and Atut could 
be seen as dispensable and lose whatever political protection from suspicion and 
prosecution that they now enjoy.
Naturally there has been opposition mounted against the Rau group's dominance 
in Banten. Some ex-Bakor members formed an anti-Rau organization named M3B 
(Majelis Musyawarah Masyarakat Banten, Deliberative Council of Bantenese Society), 
but it was ineffective. Moreover, the media in general fear to be too critical of Chasan, 
as machetes could be their reward for any criticism.
60 The Governor-General was a Dutch colonial bureaucratic guardian from the Netherlands East Indies 
during colonial times. Chasan was unhesitantly dubbed as the colonial top guardian.
61 Romli, "jawara dan Penguasa Lokal di Provinsi Banten (2001-2006)," pp. 237-38.
62 The rumor was that Djoko was arrested to clear the road for Atut to become the provincial governor, 
considering the fact that Djoko's arrest occurred about a year before Banten's direct gubernatorial election. 
Atut could mobilize the provincial bureaucracy freely if Djoko was out and she became the acting 
governor.
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Direct Election of Governor: Time for Change or Time for Further Consolidation?
In November 2006, the first direct election of the provincial governor was held in 
Banten province. This election represented a potential departure from the dominance 
of the Rau group in the province. But the Rau group was well-prepared. A few years 
before the election, the governor, Djoko Munandar, had been arrested for corruption, 
and at that time Atut Chosiyah became the acting governor. That promotion gave her a 
free hand to mobilize the provincial bureaucracy to ensure her victory in the 2006 
election.
Party Support for Atut
Four pairs of candidates ran for the election, as shown in Table 3. The Rau group, 
of course, supported the acting governor (that is, Chasan's daughter, Atut). The new 
decentralization law, No. 33/2003, stipulated that each pair of candidates for governor 
and vice governor needed the support of political parties. The Rau group sought 
support mainly from the largest party in the province, Golkar, led by Jusuf Kalla, and 
the third largest party in the province, PDI-P, led by ex-president Megawati.
Table 3
Banten Governor Election: Candidates, Supporting Parties, and Results
Candidate for Governor Tryana Syamun Atut Chosiyah Irsjad Djuwaeli Zulkieflimansyah
Candidate for Vice Governor Benjamin Davnie M. Masduki Mas A. Danili Marissa Haque
Supporting Party (Seats PPP (8) Golkar (16) Partai Demokrat (9) PKS (11)
in the Provincial Parliament)* PAN (4) 
Number/percentage of votes per district or city:
PDI-P (10) 
PBR (5)
PBB (3)
PDS (2) 
PKPB (1) 
Partai Patriot (0)
PKB (5) PSI (1)
Serang District 175,297/23.4% 282,698/37.7% 33,759/4.5% 258,419/34.4%
Cilegon City 25,339/16.8% 58,509/38.7% 4,276/2.8% 63,044/41.7%
Lebak District 118,435/22.2% 278,805/52.3% 29,029/5.4% 106,401/20.0%
Pandeglang District 151,723/30.0% 214,202/42.3% 26,474/5.2% 113,780/22.5%
Tangerang District 258,263/22.7% 434,468/38.1% 38,849/3.4% 407,403/35.8%
Tangeran City 89,219/17.1% 176,775/34.0% 15,535/3.0% 239,148/45.9%
Banten Province (totals) 818,276/22.7% 1,445,457/40.2% 147,922/4.1% 1,188,195/33.0%
Source: Provincial Election Committee
* PPP = United Development Party; PAN = National Mandate Party; Golkar = Party of the 
Functional Groups; PDI-P = Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; PBR = Reform Star Party; 
PBB = Crescent Star Party; PDS = Prosperous and Peace Party; PKPB = Functional Party for 
National Concern; Partai Patriot = Patriot Party; Partai Demokrat = Democratic Party;
PKB = National Awakening Party; PKS = Prosperous Justice Party; PSI = Islam Sarekat Party
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Some of the provincial Golkar cadres clearly opposed Atut because of her lack of 
leadership. However, the final decision was not made by Golkar's provincial branch 
but by its central board. Golkar gave high priority to the accuracy of polling results 
and used two polling agencies, Saiful Muzani's LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 
Indonesian Survey Institute) and Denny JA's LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, 
Indonesian Survey Circle, an offshoot of Saiful's LSI). The result of polling in 2005 
showed the highest support for Atut, at around 20 percent. In second place was 
Marissa Haque, a famous actress, and in third place was Tryana Sjamun, a rich 
businessman.
Some of Golkar's board members tried to support Tryana instead of Atut in order 
to break down the dominance of the Rau group. Tryana belonged to the Icar (Aburizal 
Bakrie) faction within Golkar, and the member in charge of the Banten province on the 
central board was changed from Tajuddin Nursaid to Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, 
son of Ginandjar Kastasasmita, an ally of Icar.63 Icar was one of the most successful 
businessmen supported by Ginandjar, an influential technocrat during the New Order 
and, in 2001, head of the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah, DPD), which was in charge of decentralization policies. Ginanjar's son 
belonged on Icar's side. So, perhaps the change was instigated by the Icar group to 
bolster Golkar's potential support for Tryana.
Tryana's supporters moved to increase his popularity in the province, but the 
second polling in January 2006 showed that Atut still had the highest rate of support, 
20 percent, compared to only 8 percent for Tryana.64 Based on these low approval 
ratings, Tryana's supporters suggested that he choose the popular Marissa as his 
vice-gubernatorial candidate on the assumption that their combined votes could 
surpass the votes for Atut. He rejected this strategy, and the support for his candidacy 
waned in Golkar.65
On July 2, 2006, the provincial branch of Golkar organized a convention to confirm 
the candidates for governor, but the convention committee only permitted Atut to run 
in the convention.66 Other potential candidates, such as two Golkar members from the 
national parliament, Aly Yahya and Irsjad Djuwaeli, withdrew from the contest. (Aly 
Yahya took the registration form, but he never submitted it.) Two of Golkar's central 
board members, Agung Laksono and Kartasasmita, intervened in the selection process 
at the provincial level. This "undemocratic" negation of the convention touched off a 
severe backlash from some of the provincial branch cadres. Sam Rachmat, one of the 
selection team members, called a press conference to criticize the process and was 
subsequently forced to resign from Golkar's provincial branch. Not surprisingly, the 
convention chose Atut as Golkar's sole candidate for the Banten governor's race by
63 Tajuddin was the regional coordinator for Jakarta and Banten, but later his jurisdiction was limited to 
Jakarta, and Agus was put in charge of West Java and Banten. Interview with a Golkar cadre on December 
4, 2007.
64 The polling by Denny's LSI in May 2006 showed that Atut's popularity rose to 38.7 percent while 
Tryana's was at 10.3 percent. See LSI's (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) survey report, Laporan Survei Propinsi 
Banten (May 2006).
65 Interview with a young Golkar cadre from the central board on February 7, 2007.
66 "Konvensi Golkar Disayangkan," Radar Banten Online (http://www.radarbanten.com/), accessed on June 
26, 2006.
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acclamation. Sam was not fired, but instead was installed as the provincial team head 
to ensure Atut's victory (Tim Sukses Atut).67 The Rau group was quite skillful in its 
dealings with a recalcitrant party member. Sam had no choice but to support her and 
risk losing face if she lost the contest.
The Rau group shrewdly intervened in PDI-P's decision-making process as well. A 
PDI-P assembly member, Marissa, wished to run for the governorship and had strong 
support in the provincial branches. Marissa is a famous actress, and her husband, 
Ikang Fauzi, is a well-known rock singer from Lebak district; their fame promised to be 
an important resource in the election. The special regional working meeting (Rapat 
Kerja Daerah Khusus, Rakerdasus) of the PDI-P provincial branch was held on April 5, 
2006, to decide PDI-P's gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates. Atut won 714 
votes, while Marissa garnered just 543 votes, meaning that a PDI-P parliament member 
lost to a Golkar cadre. This upset was possible because some of the PDI-P provincial 
cadres belonged to the Rau group, and vote buying was quite effective in convincing 
other non-Rau group members to support Atut, according to Marissa. Marissa rejected 
the result, saying "the prime reason to reject the result is that the process of Rakerdasus 
was rife with money politics and the result was totally different from the aspiration of 
active PDI-P provincial members."68 Later, the central board of PDI-P chose Atut as 
the party's sole gubernatorial candidate.
These other parties also supported Atut: two Islamic parties, Star and Crescent 
Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) and Crescent and Reformation Party (Partai Bintang 
Reformasi, PBR); one Christian party, Peace and Welfare Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, 
PDS); and the two nationalistic parties, Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai 
Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB) and Patriot Party (Partai Patriot). The internal conflict 
within PBR was notably curious. The PBR provincial branch selected six candidates for 
governor, but the president of PBR, Zainuddin MZ, formerly an influential Islamic 
preacher, held a plenary meeting in Atut's house and rejected those six candidates, 
nominating her instead as PBR's gubernatorial candidate, even though she was not 
among the six candidates chosen by the local PBR branches.
Finding Atut's Partner
The Rau group successfully obtained the support of seven parties (these seven 
parties account for 37 of the 75 seats in the provincial parliament). The next challenge 
for the Rau group was deciding who should be Atut's running mate. Someone from 
the Tangerang area would be ideal, as more than half of the voters lived there. The Rau 
group had weak influence in the Tangerang area, however. The Tangerang area is 
urbanized and ethnically heterogeneous, so the provincial bureaucratic links and the 
jawara network that the Rau group could mobilize were not always effective there. 
Moreover, undecided voters constituted the majority.
Another problem for the Rau group was that the Tangerang district head, Ismet 
Iskandar, and Tangerang's mayor, Wahidin Halim, were united in their dissatisfaction 
with acting-governor Atut's policies and leadership. So together they tried to find
67 Interview with Sam Rachmat on February 1, 2007.
68 "Marissa Haque Tolak PDI-P Calonkan Atut," Gatra, August 6, 2006.
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someone who could better represent the politico-economic interests of the Tangerang 
area as governor or vice governor. At first, Wahidin had intended to run for election 
himself, and some candidates, including Atut, even solicited him to be their 
vice-gubernatorial running mate. However, he wished to be governor, but finally 
bowed out of the race altogether, partly because he estimated he could not win the 
election. So Wahidin, in coordination with Ismet, allowed Tangerang's regional 
planning agency head, Benyamin Davnie, to run for election as Tryana's partner. 
(Tryana, who was born in Pandeglang district, needed support from the Tangerang 
area.) The team of Tryana-Benyamin presented a viable threat to the Rau group.
The Rau group at first leaned toward choosing a famous ex-Tangerang district 
head, Zakaria Machmud, as Atut's running mate, but finally chose H. M. Masduki, an 
ex-social department head from West Java province. He was selected because he had 
several times been subdistrict head in the Tangerang area, was the son of a locally 
famous ulama, and was a relative of Benyamin and could win over some part of his 
constituency. On September 1, 2006, the Golkar provincial branch formally named 
Masduki as Atut's vice-gubernatorial running mate. Other parties followed suit, and 
on September 6, 2006, the Atut-Masduki pair was declared formally with their 
registration to the provincial election committee.
PKS as Tough Competitor
The Rau group's strongest opponents were the candidates from the second-largest 
party in the Banten province, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperity and Justice 
Party). PKS was established by an Islamic proselytizing group found mainly at major 
universities, such as the University of Indonesia and Technology Institute of Bandung. 
PKS, which has its own leader development system, has expanded its constituencies 
mainly in urban areas, with the intent of influencing "political morals." The proportion 
of votes gained by PKS in Banten increased rapidly, from 2.6 percent in 1999 to 11.9 
percent in 2004. PKS attracted voters not only from the urban middle class but also 
from the urban labor class, with strongholds in the Tangerang and Cilegon areas. The 
core members of PKS are typically in their thirties and politically inexperienced with 
regard to holding public office. The PKS therefore sought a capable gubernatorial 
candidate from outside its ranks, to be paired with a PKS member as the 
vice-gubernatorial candidate. PKS needed a leader of experience to aid the party's 
political expansion and give it credibility, and the Banten gubernatorial election was 
the first good opportunity to arise after PKS's successful mayoral campaign in Depok.69
PKS approached Wahidin. Wahidin, a career bureaucrat and graduate of the 
University of Indonesia, had a great deal of experience dealing with several Islamic 
organizations. He was popular among the citizens of Tangerang city because of his 
populist approach toward the people and his Islamic piety. When the Tangerang city 
government issued a bylaw, No. 8/2005, against prostitution, which had the flavor of
69 The Depok mayoral election was held in July 2005, with PKS's candidate, ex-minister Nur Mahmudi 
Ismail, winning the election. PKS chose him as the party's candidate even though he was not a core 
member of PKS. PKS regarded Ismail's administration as a showcase for other regions, that is, to show 
that PKS-led governments were not radically Islamic as some claimed, and that PKS was a "normal" party 
and was not so different from other political parties. Interview with Zulkieflimansyah on February 11, 
2007.
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Islamic law, it was rumored that Wahidin had strategically engineered its passage in 
order to win the support of PKS in his run for the governorship. Finally, however, 
Wahidin declined to run because of weak financial backing and the likelihood that he 
would lose to the incumbent.
PKS finally approached Marissa, after the PDI-P chose Atut. PKS's choice was 
based on the calculation that it already enjoyed substantial support among urban 
voters and Marissa's popularity as a well-known actress could attract votes from the 
rural area. Marissa accepted the offer with the condition that she would run for the 
election as a vice governor and Zulkieflimansyah, a cadre of PKS, would be her partner 
as candidate for governor. Zulkiefli was born in NTB (Nusa Tenggara Barat, West 
Nusa Tenggara Province) in 1972 and has been a University of Indonesia lecturer of 
management. He holds two master's degrees and earned his doctorate in England. He 
was elected as a member of parliament from PKS in 2004. PKS expected its 
Zulkiefli-Marissa pair to be formidable challengers against Atut-Masduki.
Rau's Election Strategy: Rice in Exchange for the Rural Poor's Votes
According to the provincial head of Tim Sukses Atut, 65 percent of the people in 
Banten Province are "pragmatic"—meaning ready to barter their vote—while only 35 
percent can be called "rational," since they actually consider and judge the qualities of 
the candidates when voting for governor, which is why money counts so much in 
winning the gubernatorial election.70 Capitalizing on voters' materialism was one of 
the most significant characteristics of the Atut-Masduki campaign. "Only an affluent 
man can afford to judge what is good and what is bad"71 and the most urgent matter 
for the rural poor is to feed themselves and their families. Moral judgments are 
secondary to rice for survival. The Atut-Masduki team understood this 
non-ideological concept of "the conquest of rice" quite well. The team targeted the 
most needy orang hutan (forest people) in the rural areas. The team distributed money 
to them without triggering any accusations from the election observation committee. 
The committee was made up of middle-class people who didn't dare to check remote 
rural areas and had no power to investigate the legality or illegality of any candidate's 
campaign tactics. Additionally, the Atut-Masduki team adopted a sell-buy 
vote-getting system called sistem jual-beli. The team chose five people as vote 
canvassers for each polling station (Tempat Pemungutan Suara, TPS) and provided 
each one with a campaign slush fund based on the number of voters they were 
expected to buy. If the number of votes for Atut in a given TPS surpassed the number 
that was expected, any leftover money need not be refunded to the campaign.72 Also, 
serangan fajar (dawn attack), the buying of votes at dawn on the day of the election, was 
common.
70 Interview with a Golkar provincial cadre on February 1, 2007.
71 Miyazaki Manabu, Kindai Yakuza Kotei Ron: Yamaguchi Gumi no 90 Nen [Positive Argument on Modern 
Yakuza: 90 Years of Yamaguchi Yakuza Group] (Tokyo: Tsukuma, 2007), p. 269.
72 If the actual votes cast for Atut didn't equal the votes that were "purchased," the vote canvassers had an 
obligation to return money to the campaign team, according to the contract. Such refunds didn't occur, 
however, because Atut won the election anyway. Confidential interview on February 1, 2007.
jawara in Power 131
The Atut-Masduki pair supposedly spent around 300 billion rupiah (US$33 
million) in total and 70 percent of the money took the form of provincial projects 
geared to support the pair.73
The Historical Federation of Jawara Organizations: PPPSBBI and BPPKB
In October 2005, a social organization called "The Unified Banten Volunteers" 
(Relawan Banten Bersatu, RBB) was initiated by Chasan and was supported by 
seventeen others, including Lulu Kaking, the provincial head of the Patriot Party and 
the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila), and Aep Saefudin, the secretary general of 
PPPSBBI. The "formal" reason for the establishment of this organization was said to be 
the fact that reformasi had deviated from its initial purposes. According to its founders, 
RBB was formed to resist the threat of national disintegration and any biased 
interpretation of the national motto, "unity in diversity." RBB would reportedly be 
based on the fighting soul, spirit, and values of 1945—Jiwa Semangat Nilai '4574—that 
had been forged during the Indonesian revolution for the independence, 1945 to 1949. 
This formal RBB platform was quite similar to PPPSBBI's and showed influences from 
the New Order.
Six months later, the actual purpose of RBB was revealed. The real commander was 
neither Chasan nor any of the other seventeen supporters, but Chasan's first son, 
Chaeri Wardana, who had studied management at an Australian university. Wardana 
tried to consolidate jawara and forge them into this new organization, RBB, by 
coordinating two of the most influential jawara organizations, the PPPSBBI and the 
Agency to Develop the Potentialities of the Bantenese (Badan Pembina Potensi 
Keluarga Besar Banten, BPPKB), in order to elect Atut governor. BPPKB had been 
established on July 8,1998. The founder and president of BPPKB is Noer Indradjaja SH, 
who in 2006 was the head of the legal section of Sunter Agung Co. Ltd and recently 
established a new company, Melawai Jaya Realty Co, Ltd. Sunter Agung is a holding 
company of Agung Podomoro Business Group and Melaway Jaya Realty is a group 
company of Agung Podomoro. This group manages twenty-seven large-scale property 
projects in Jakarta and its surrounding area, with a total capital of 15 trillion rupiah.75 
When Noer Indradjaja founded BPPKB, an ethnic Bantenese-based organization, eight 
families from Pandeglang district also joined. BPPKB grew rapidly, with membership 
reaching 8.7 million as of February 2006 and branches in almost all Indonesian 
provinces, according to a BPPKB leader (this claim may be exaggerated). BPPKB 
sources claim that it has four million members residing in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, 
and Bekasi. The organization's area of influence in Jakarta covers West Jakarta and 
North Jakarta, including Tanjung Priok harbor. These areas are still the frontiers for 
real estate developers. BPPKB builds command posts (pos komando, posko) to 
demonstrate their presence and power throughout the city. If their figures are correct,
73 Confidential interview on February 1, 2007.
74 "Laporan Khusus: Relawan Banten Bersatu: Mengantisipasi Disintegrasi Bangsa," Terns. June 2006, p.
49.
75 See: www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/1/ trihatma-kusuma-haliman/index.shtml, accessed on 
October 14, 2008.
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then in terms of membership, BPPKB has already surpassed other Bantenese 
organizations that have operated in Jakarta, such as Warga Banten and PPPSBBI.
RBB began operations in March 2006, and its establishment was formally declared 
in May 2006. RBB's unique organizational structure, shown in Table 4, consisted of two 
pillars—the cadre (executive board) and the family. This organization relied on both a 
typical modern organizational structure and familial network. It seems that the 
function of the familial network was to control the cadres. RBB had its coordinators 
even at the village level. The May 2006 ceremony to celebrate the founding of RBB was 
essentially a show of force, meant to demonstrate support for the Atut-Masduki 
candidacy. It was attended by local oligarchs and strongmen dressed in colors that 
demonstrated their support for Atut, whose influential family connections were clearly 
recognized. Aep Saefuddin of PPPSBBI challenged those who dared to question these 
tactics: "Do you really think that we can keep the post-election condition under control 
if we fail to have Atut win the gubernatorial election?"76
In February 2007, after the election, an RBB cadre explained the situation in this 
way, clearly outlining the character of RBB and jawara in general.
The spiritual core of RBB is BPPKB and PPPSBBI. If PPPSBBI and BPPKB are 
made to act separately, it is no good. Their image would suffer. In the future, 
mature thinking and emotional approaches with no violence would be 
evidently smarter. We really hope to show that the characteristics of the 
Bantenese are tough [keras] but not coarse [kasar]. If a person treats us politely, 
we will also treat him politely. But if one tricks us, we will take coarse actions to 
deal with him. That is why we are prepared to face anyone or group [that is 
critical of Atut's success] when the provincial election committee made an 
announcement yesterday that Atut won the election. Any group that harasses 
the constitution will face the Bantenese people, in this case, RBB. RBB is 
supported by PPPSBBI and BPPKB and also by others, including 118 schools of 
pencak silat.77
The above shows that (1) PPPSBBI and BPPKB collaborated to support Atut, (2) the 
Bantenese, especially jawara, are regarded as keras, (3) jawara will not hesitate to use 
violence when they feel harassed, and (4) jawara may use more peaceful measures to 
solve problems in the future, if possible. The clear message was that jawara, both from 
PPPSBBI and from BPPKB, were prepared to be mobilized if Atut faced difficulties.78
Co-opted Young Intellectuals
Wardana knew that the social powers of jawara were not always effective in 
winning direct elections. Shows of force could result in a backlash against Atut. So, on 
March 10, 2005, he established a new organization, the Institution for the Unified 
Banten (Lembaga Banten Bersatu, LBB). This was a think tank designed to help Atut win
76 Interview with Aep Saefudin on February 5, 2007, by a young NGO activist, Anis Fuad.
77 Confidential interview with an RBB cadre on February 5, 2007.
78 One cadre of the Tim Sukses admitted that the organization had prepared a secret strategy for 
Atut-Masduki if the pair lost the election. Interview on February 1, 2007.
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Table 4
Tentative Executive Board of RBB in Banten Province
District/City Executive Board Family
Tangerang City Lurah H. Marhaman Komang 
H. Syukur
H. Lurah Dody Anwar 
Roni (BPPKB) 
ex-Colonel Samlawi Muslih 
M. Junaedi 
Toni
Drs. Hikmat Tomet 
Moh. Alwi Juri
Tangerang District H. Jahudi 
Lurah Maje'n 
H. Udin Syhbudin 
H. Oong 
H. Haer 
Edi Senopati
H. Aden Lilis K. 
H. Tavip
Serang District U. Uding (BPPKB)
KH Ali Nurdin 
KH Suhemi Ibnu Saba 
Abdurrahman 
ex-Colonel Umar Navis 
H.M. Hartono 
H. Madurip
Hj. Rt. Lilis K.
H. Uci Sanusi 
H. Tb. Yana Kaking
Cilegon City H. Ade Miftah 
H. Nana
H. Ahmad (BPPKB) 
H. Habibudin 
H. Zaidan Rifa'i 
Heri Herianto
H. Tb. Chaerul Zaman 
Asep Keben 
H. Fuad SE
Pandeglang District H. Edi Jupraeni 
H. Jajat Muhahidin 
H. Iding 
H. Gojali 
Endoh (BPPKB)
H. Maman E. 
Samuti
H. Hadi Mulyana
Hj. Rt. Tatu Hasanah SE
H. Juanda
Hj. Tita Rusdinar
Lebak District H. Irja Kharis 
H. Sumantri 
H. Kasmin 
H. Rusmani (BPPKB) 
KH Drs. Mubin Arsudi 
H. Apih Juli 
H. Heri 
Agus Wisas
H. Sadeli
H. Tb. Didi Satibi
H. Juhaeri
Source: Laporan Khusus: Relawan Banten Bersatu: Mengantisipasi Disintegrasi Bangsa, Teras 
Juni 2006, p. 48.
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the election. Wardana recruited sixty members, the majority of them young intellectual 
activists. For example, one of the recruits, Ferry Muchlis Ariefmuzzaman, was an 
ex-head of the Islamic Students' Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) in 
Ciputat, Tangerang. Others included Komarudin and Hamied, HMI activists in 
Ciputat; Erdi Bachtiar, an activist from Indonesian Islam Student Movement 
(Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII); and Ahmad Jazuli, vice director of the 
Banten provincial branch of National Committee for Indonesian Youth (Komite 
Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). The young cadres from a modern Islamic 
boarding school (pondok pesantren), Pondok Pesantren Daar El Qoram at Gintung, 
Tangerang, joined LBB, too. Many of these young students come from the Tangerang 
area. Clearly, Wardana was following a strategy to draw in the rational voters in 
Tangerang through the young intellectuals. And pollster Denny JA, executive director 
of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, was invited to act as a consultant for Atut-Masduki's 
election team.
LBB at first utilized the RBB network to mobilize the masses and to display the 
posters and banners of Atut-Masduki. RBB had coordinators at the subdistrict and 
village levels. Later, however, when Wardana became aware of the poor performance 
of RBB's subdistrict and village coordinators, he developed his own connections there. 
He included Chasan's family members as coordinators, and they were expected to 
control the funding for the campaign at the community level, to display campaign 
posters and banners, and to mobilize people at the grassroots level.
The most important duty of LBB was to formulate the campaign strategy, including 
funding, logistics, events, and programming, and to promote the positive 
characteristics of Atut-Masduki. For instance, LBB printed 1.7 million copies of a 2006 
calendar with the photo of Atut as acting governor and started to distribute them in 
October 2005.79
LBB used every opportunity and institution to publicize acting-governor Atut. The 
provincial bureaucracies were fully mobilized. Agah M. Noor, the program division 
head of LBB and coordinator of the provincial government projects, was nicknamed by 
the provincial bureaucrats "the fourth regional secretary"80 because of his coordinating 
expertise. All the provincial projects were Atut-labeled ones, forcibly imprinting the 
image of Atut on voters' minds. The money, materials, and benefits from government 
projects were attributed to Atut. Agah also initiated so-called "Santa Claus" activities. 
When a provincial department started up a development program called "safari 
pembangunan" (development safari) in which Atut herself visited the location and 
distributed food and other goods in accordance with the needs of the community, 
other provincial departments were obliged to contribute 10 to 25 million rupiah to the 
program. This largesse a snowball effect, and the recipient communities received large 
benefits from each program. Atut's "Christmas" boxes were thus popular and effective 
in eliciting the sympathy of rural community members. Almost all of those 
communities voted for Atut on election day, according to an anonymous, highly 
placed officer in the provincial government.
79 A focus-group discussion was held to choose the best photo of Atut to use for the calendar.
80 The Banten provincial government has just three regional secretaries.
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Additionally, an event organizer whom Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had hired 
during his presidential election campaign and one of Indonesia's most famous 
photographers worked together to produce a finely tuned and well-made-up Atut, so 
that she would be well received by the rural people. Wardana's wife, Airin Rachmi 
Diany, an actress, helped out. LBB intensively produced and distributed positive 
propaganda for Atut. Atut was heavily publicized as an ideal woman and mother who 
devoted herself to religious and social activities. To further this effort, Agah intervened 
in the activities of the provincial bureau of public relations by ordering that the 
provincial government's LBB-designed ad be published locally. Three local 
newspapers carried this ad, calling attention to the province's acting governor—Atut.
In conclusion, the political resources of the Atut-Masduki team were social 
materialism, bribery, an Atut-oriented bureaucracy, and a well-groomed Atut. Add to 
that the influence of the twin organizations RBB and LBB, which provided physical 
power and young, intellectual power, respectively.
Atut-Masduki: Winners by a Slim Margin
The election was held on November 6, 2007. The Atut-Masduki team defeated the 
Zulkiefli-Marissa team by the slim margin of around 7 percent. Atut-Masduki gained 
a sweeping victory in the Lebak and Pandeglang districts and won by a slim margin in 
the Serang and Tangerang districts; the pair lost to Zukiefli-Marissa in the Cilegon and 
Tangerang cities, as shown in Table 3. This result was virtually identical to the two 
LSIs' polling predictions.
Despite the polls, the Atut-Masduki team had been expected to win easily. So why 
did the incumbent win by only a slim margin? First of all, there existed widespread 
discontent with the local hegemony of the Rau group in Banten province. Second, 
PKS's solid political machine ran smoothly, especially in the urban area. But why, if 
many of the local elites were dissatisfied with the Atut administration, did the 
incumbent win the election at all? First, of course, the political resources of Atut were 
unequaled. Second, the popularity of Marissa could not beat the rice and other "gifts" 
that Atut distributed freely to orcrng hutcm in rural areas. Third, the Tryana-Benyamin 
pair did not distribute as much campaign money to the tim sukses (success team) as 
their supporters had hoped. Tryana himself emphasized "clean politics" in his election 
campaign.81 However, less money resulted in fewer votes. Without the money, the tim 
sukses were not sufficiently motivated to garner votes for Tryana.
Epilogue: From Election to Consolidation and Regeneration
The New Order state organized jawara into a regionally centralized organization, 
later called PPPSBBI, in the early 1970s. Previously, jawara existed as an informal 
collective social agent that could play the role of both negative and positive mediator
81 It is not clear whether Tryana really wanted to win the election. One of the most important motivations 
to run for the governorship might have been to show his seriousness to dedicate himself to Bantenese 
development. His staunch supporters were twice disappointed with him when he declined to run for the 
governor in 2001 and again declined to run for the DPD election in 2004. Interview with Tryana Sjamun on 
April 16, 2007.
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or problem solver or social "security" enforcer. Jawara sometimes helped the rural poor 
(i.e., as a positive service provider) and at other times exploited them (i.e., as a negative 
service provider). Modern ideology had almost no meaning for jawara. Their weapons 
have been intimidation, pencak silat, blow and assault, and ilmu. These jawara have no 
inherent (ideological) direction; sometimes they rise in revolt against the current 
central government, as if to defend the people, and at other times they mobilize to 
crush the people's resistance movements, jawara have been a semi-socially embedded 
entity. The New Order state decidedly transformed them, however. Many jawara 
milked economic benefits from the state and obtained contracts for state-related 
business or projects. The corollary was the jawaras' dependence on the state and their 
increasing detachment from society during the New Order, as jawara started to 
advocate a nationalist ideology.
The fall of Suharto was both a challenge and an opportunity for the nationalistic 
jawara, as the state made a partial retreat from all aspects of life. Democratization and 
decentralization gave wider economic and political opportunities to local societies. 
Threats and the occasional exercise of violence and shows of force proved to be 
important and quick tools for politico-economic capital accumulation, especially at the 
local level. The state has been tolerating private security forces' existence and that has 
caused the further collusion between sections of the formal forces (military and police) 
and private forces, especially at the local level. The changing paradigm of the state 
regarding "security" has had broad impacts upon society. The police have separated 
from the military and claimed an increasing role in enforcing internal security, in the 
process effectively legalizing the civilian militias that assist them. This development 
follows a global trend toward increasingly privatized security enforcement and 
increased "sanctioned" violence.
The security business has become a profitable enterprise, and private security 
groups can vary from professional enterprises to yakuza-style (organized crime) 
operations. Security objectives and the methods used to implement them likewise vary. 
The ambiguous character of the security business in post-Suharto Indonesia 
represented a rare opportunity for jawara to expand their economic resources by 
controlling the local governments. PPPSBBI "secured" (mengamankan) Banten province 
by sending black-clad members as body guards during president Megawati's visit in 
2004, while BPPKB has rapidly expanded its membership and its business by 
providing "security" for those who are prepared to pay for their "negative" service.
The Rau group successfully retained the governorship, allowing its members and 
supporters to consolidate their politico-economic power and maintain their 
benefit-producing system by milking the provincial budget. Another fact to be pointed 
out is that the Rau group's success in the 2007 election paved the way for the smooth 
transfer of power from Chasan to his son(s) and daughter(s). Chasan has repeatedly 
said, "There is no more meaningful thing in my life other than making my children 
leaders,"82 and he did it faithfully. His eldest son, Wardana, showed his capability by 
commanding the election campaign while his eldest daughter, Atut, became governor 
by presenting herself as an ideal Bantenese woman and starting to forge the 
politico-economic power of the Rau group. The regeneration of the Rau group had
82 'Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah," Tempo, December 9, 2007, p. 36.
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begun. Chasan is now rumored to receive few visitors who ask for his signature on 
various documents; instead, they are directed to see Wardana and Atut. Wardana's 
first, main job after the election was to reshuffle provincial governmental posts, with 
those who had supported Atut during the election and showed loyalty to Wardana 
typically getting the best positions.83
Chasan has been married to many women, but has kept four legal wives in the 
Islamic sense, and has many children and sons- and daughters-in-laws.84 Some of 
them are involved on the economic and political stage, too. Airin, the wife of Wardana, 
ran in the Tangerang district elections for vice-district head. Her partner was PKS's 
Jazuli Juwaini. Lilis Karyawati, Chasan's daughter, is now the Serang district head of 
Kadin. Hikmat, Atut's husband, and Wardana are the vice heads of provincial Kadin, 
and Chasan's third wife, Ratna Komalasari, and Chasan's daughter Tatu Chasanah are 
heading the committees in provincial Kadin. Atut's son Andika Hazrumi will run in 
the DPD election in 2009. Chasan's son Haerul Jaman is now running for vice mayor in 
Serang city. The Rau group seems to be reaching its zenith now, with one tabloid 
journalist calling Chasan "the king of Banten" (Raja Banten).85 However, it remains to 
be seen how long Rau's success will last.
Two problems haunt the Rau group. The first is a governance problem. The 
provincial government is more and more neo-patrimonial, and all politico-economic 
rent is exclusively allocated to the group. Personnel policies are not based on the merit 
system but on one's loyalty to the Rau group. As a result, the performance of the local 
government has suffered, and anger from outside the group is on the rise. For example, 
eight years have passed since construction of the provincial government office building 
started, but it is still not finished. The perception is that the administration's 
performance has been compromised.
The second problem is Rau's loosening ties with the political center, a network that 
it had fostered mainly through Golkar. In February 2008, the Tangerang district head 
election was held, and the Rau candidates lost by a wide margin to the incumbent, 
Ismet Iskandar, and his running mate, Rano Karno, a famous actor. Based on its 
experience in the previous gubernatorial election, the Rau group had formed an 
acrobatic but rational coalition with yesterday's enemy, PKS. Rau campaigned for 
PKS's Jazuli for bupati and Airin, the wife of Wardana, for vice bupati. The huge 
amount of money and public-relations effort invested, however, did not bear fruit. The 
incumbent, supported by the central boards of Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, and another twelve 
parties, won the election. Even though Atut was a Golkar board member, her support 
and the Rau group's support of Jazuli and Airin antagonized some of the Golkar 
cadres and may have weakened Rau's local power base. Golkar's political preference, 
especially that of its central board, might revert from the Rau group to others, and the 
prosecutor's office might thereafter suddenly resurrect stalemated corruption cases 
that target the Rau group or it supporters.
83 "Kabinet Tanda Jasa," Komunitas Tabloid Investigasi 1,3 (February 1-15, 2007): 3-6. They needed to pay 
for the positions, too. One department head position was said to cost around one million rupiah. Interview 
with an NGO activist on February 10, 2007.
84 "Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah," Tempo, December 9, 2007, p. 36.
85 "Prof. Dr. Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib: Pendekar dan Raja Banten," Kabinet Indonesia 13,2 (2006): 1.
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Jawara may always exist as a social power, but might not exist as political actors 
without strong support from the central government. Because jawara are violent 
rent-seekers who often act outside the legal realm, they need political asylum 
(protection) to operate and remain influential. The era of democratization and 
decentralization in Indonesia is not the era of politically autonomous Raja Kecil, small 
kings, but rather the era of nationalistic or state-entrenched local oligarchies, bolstered 
by the return of the transformed Indonesian state.
